Abstract. Camellia is a block cipher selected as a standard by ISO/IEC, which has been analyzed by a number of cryptanalysts. In this paper, we propose several 6-round impossible differential paths of Camellia with the F L/F L −1 layer in the middle of them. With the impossible differential and a well-organized precomputational table, impossible differential attacks on 10-round Camellia-192 and 11-round Camellia-256 are given, and the time complexity are 2 175 and 2 206.8 respectively. An impossible differential attack on 15-round Camellia-256 without F L/F L −1 layers and whitening is also be given, which needs about 2 236.1 encryptions. To the best of our knowledge, these are the best cryptanalytic results of Camellia-192/-256 with F L/F L −1 layers and Camellia-256 without F L/F L −1 layers to date.
Introduction
Block cipher Camellia is proposed by NTT and Mitsubishi in 2000 [1] . Its block size is 128 bits and it supports 128-, 192-and 256-bit key sizes with 18, 24 and 24 rounds respectively. Camellia was selected as an e-government recommended cipher by CRYPTREC [5] and recommended in NESSIE [15] block cipher portfolio. Then it was selected as an international standard by ISO/IEC.
The structure of Camellia is Feistel structure with F L/F L −1 layers inserted every 6 rounds. The F L and F L −1 functions are keyed linear functions which are designed to provide nonregularity across rounds [1] . In the past years, Camellia has attracted the attention of the cryptanalytic community. The square-type attacks are efficient to attack Camellia, which can be used to analysis 9-round Camellia-128 and 10-round Camellia-256 [11] . Furthermore, Hatano et al. used the higher order differential attack to analysis the last 11 rounds Camellia-256 with complexity 2 255.6 [7] .
There are a number of results on simple versions of Camellia which exclude the F L/F L −1 layers and whitening being given in recent years [6, 10, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19] . Among them, the impossible differential attacks [3] are most efficient [13, 14, 17, 18] . Since the existence of F L/F L −1 layers will probably destroy the impossibility, non of the impossible differential paths in these attacks includes the F L/F L −1 layers. In this paper, we present 6-round impossible differential paths with F L/F L −1 layers in the middle, which turn out to be first impossible differential paths with F L/F L −1 layers. Due to one of these impossible differential paths and a precomputational table that is carefully consturcted, we propose impossible differential attacks on 10-round Camellia-192 and 11-round (Round 1-11) Camellia-256 with complexity 2 175 and 2 206.8 respectively.
For the attacks of Camellia-256 without F L/F L −1 layers and whitening, the 14-round attack in [13] was pointed out to be incorrect by [20] . Later Mala et al. [14] pointed out a flaw in [20] and showed that the time complexities of the 12-round Camellia-128 and 16-round Camellia-256 attacks were more than exhaustive search. As a result, the best analysis of Camellia-256 without F L/F L −1 layers and whitening dated back to [12] , which was a 13-round attack with complexity 2 211.7 . By carefully using the subkey relations and one of the 8-round impossible differential paths without F L/F L −1 layers proposed in [18] , we also present an impossible differential attack on 15-round Camellia-256 without F L/F L −1 layers and whitening, and the complexity is about 2 236.1 encryptions.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We give some notations and a brief description of Camellia in Section 2. Some properties and 6-round impossible differential paths with F L/F L −1 layers of Camellia are given in Section 3. Section 4 describes the impossible differential attacks on reduced-round Camellia with F L/F L −1 layers and whitening. The impossible differential attack on 15-round Camellia-256 without F L/F L −1 layers and whitening is illustrated in Section 5. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 6.
Preliminaries
Some notions used in this paper and a simple description of the Camellia algorithm are given in this section.
Notations
L r−1 , L r−1 : the left half of the 128-bit r-th round input R r−1 , R r−1 : the right half of the 128-bit r-th round input ∆L r−1 : the difference of L r−1 , L r−1 ∆R r−1 : the difference of R r−1 , R r−1 S r , S r : the output value of the S-box of the r-th round ∆S r : the output difference of the S-box of the r-th round k r : the 64-bit r-th round subkey, 
The Camellia Algorithm
Camellia [1] is a 128-bit block cipher with Feistel structure. It has 18 rounds for 128-bit key, and 24 rounds for 192-/256-bit key. We give the encryption procedure of Camellia-192/-256 as follows, see Fig. 1 . Encryption Procedure. The input of the encryption procedure is a 128-bit plaintext M , and 64-bit subkeys k wi (i = 1, ..., 4), k r (r = 1, ..., 24) and kl j (j = 1, ..., 6). First M is XORed with 
For r = 6, 12 and 18, do the following:
Finally the 128-bit ciphertext C is computed as:
, where:
The F L −1 function is the inverse of F L function, and F L and F L −1 are linear as long as the key is fixed [2] . The round function F is composed of the key-addition layer, S-box layer and linear transformation P . In the key-addition layer, the input of the round function is XORed with the subkey. There are 4 8 × 8 S-boxes S 1 , S 2 , S 3 , S 4 used in the S-box layer, and each S-box is used twice. Finally, the linear transformation P :
.., y 8 ). P function and its inverse function P −1 are: Using K L and K R , the key schedule algorithm first calculate K A and K B , which is described in Fig. 2 . Where F is the round function of Camellia and C i (1 ≤ i ≤ 6) are constants used as the keys. Then the subkeys k wi (i = 1, ..., 4), k r (r = 1, ..., 24) and
For details of Camellia, we refer to [1] .
It can be known from Fig. 2 that, if K B and K R are known, K A is known. Therefore, one can get K L using the relation between K L and K A described in [14] , Section 3.2. So once K B and K R are known, K can be computed.
Properties and 6-Round Impossible Differential Paths of Camellia with F L/F L −1 Functions
In this section, we first give some useful properties of Camellia and then propose several impossible differential paths.
Property 1 For a 3-round Camellia structure, if the input difference is of the form
Property 2 The necessary conditions of ∆L i+3 = (0, a, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) and ∆R i+3 = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) are:
To better describe the properties, we also illustrate them in Fig. 3 . Actually, the proofs of the properties are similar and the proof Property 1 is given as an example. Since ∆L i+2 = ∆S i+2 ⊕ ∆L i and P −1 (∆L i ) = (a, 0, a, a, a, a, 0, 0),
Property 3 (from [9] ) Let x, x * be 32-bit values, and x = x⊕x * , then the differential properties of AND and OR operations are:
Proof. Let us denote the subkey used for AND operation as k L and the subkey used for OR operation as k R . By Property 3, the following equations must hold:
Then if n i = 0 (i ∈ {5, 6, 7, 8}), it can be deduced from Equation (1) 
Impossible Differential Attack on Camellia with F L/F L −1 functions and whitening
In this section, we present impossible differential attacks on 11-round Camellia-256 and 10-round Camellia-192 using the impossible differential in Section 3.
Impossible Differential Attack on 11-Round Camellia-256
We add 3 rounds on the top and 2 rounds on the bottom of the 6-round impossible differential path to analysis 11-round Camellia-256, see Fig. 5 in the right. Denote 10 and k e = k w3 ⊕ k 11 . The attack is started by carrying out a precomputation. Precomputation. A precomputational table H for Rounds 2-3 is set up here, which contains the all possible pairs that can follow the differential in Rounds 2-3 and their corresponding subkeys k b , k c 2 . This table can also be used for Rounds 10-11, as in the backward direction, the differences are the same as that of Rounds 2-3. The table is constructed as follows: Data Collection. Choose 2 n structures of plaintexts, and each structure contains plaintexts with the following form:
where y i (i = 1, ..., 6) and x j (j = 1, ..., 8) take all possible values and α, β are fixed in each structure. As a result, there are 2 112 plaintexts in each structure and we can get 2 n × 2 112×2−1 = 2 n+223 plaintext pairs totally. For each of the pairs,
Ask for the encryptions of the plaintexts in each structure to get the corresponding ciphertexts, and keep the pairs whose ciphertext differences satisfy the following form by birthday attack:
where e, h, h 2 , h 3 , h 4 , h 5 and h 6 are non-zero bytes. So there are 2 n+223−72 = 2 n+151 pairs remaining.
Key Recovery. In the key recovery procedure, we use Property 2 and the precomputational table to discard the wrong keys. 
is obtained, which will be described as follows. The following equations are deduced from Table 3 in [1] :
We guess every possible value of K L , for each guess, K B can be calculated by Equations (2) and (3), then sieve this (K L , K B ) pair by Equation (6) . For the (K L , K B ) that satisfy Equation (6), further compute 64 bits of K A by Equation (5) . Then guess the other 64-bits of K A , by the key schedule of Camellia-256, K R can be fully determined by K B and K A . Equation (4) will further reduce the keys by a factor of 2 8 . So we get about 2 192 ×2 −8 ×2 −8 = 2 176 (K L , K R ) and the correct K = K L ||K R can be obtained by trial encryption.
Complexity. We choose n = 9, then the data complexity is 2 121 chosen plaintexts.
Step 2 removes 2 48 wrong (k b , k c 2 , k e , k d 2 ), for each pair remained after Step 1, 
Impossible Differential Attack on 10-Round Camellia-192
We remove a round from the bottom of the 11-round attack, and give an attack on 10-round Camellia-192, see Denote the equivalent subkeys k a = k w1 ⊕k 1 , k b = k w2 ⊕k 2 , k c = k w1 ⊕k 3 and k d = k w3 ⊕k 10 The key recovery phase is as follows: 
is obtained by the similar method of the 11-round attack, except that there are only for equations that can be used:
Again, we guess every possible value of K L , for each guess K B can be calculated by Equations (7) and (8), then sieve this (K L , K B ) pair by Equation (10) . For the (K L , K B ) that satisfy Equation (10), compute 8 bits of K R by Equation (9), and further guess the rest unknown 56 bits of K R . Furthermore, we test whether the (K L , K R ) can pass the key schedule of Camellia-192. About 2 184 × 2 −8 × 2 −128 = 2 48 keys will remain, and the correct K = K L ||K R can be obtained by trial encryption.
In this attack, the time complexity is dominated by Step 4, which is about 2 176 6-round encryptions, equivalent to about 2 175 10-round encryptions. The memory complexity is the same as the 11-round attack. If we did not take the pre-/post-whitening key into account, the complexity would be about 2 144 encryptions. In this section, we give an improved impossible differential attack on Camellia-256 by using a 8-round impossible differential path without F L/F L −1 layer in Fig. 7 , which was proposed in [18] . By adding 4 rounds on the top and 3 rounds on the bottom, we can attack 15-round Camellia-256 without F L/F L −1 layers and whitening, see Fig. 6 .
Precomputation. First, we set up a table Γ 1 for the first two round of the 15-round model. Property 2 implies that ∆L 1 = P (a, z 2 , z 3 ⊕ a, z 4 ⊕ a, z 5 ⊕ a, z 6 ⊕ a, 0, 0), so we choose all the 2 48 ∆L 1 with the required form. Furthermore, all possible ∆L 0 , L 0 ⊕ k 1 and (R 0 ⊕ k 2 ) 2 are chosen. For each of the values, we compute
are totally chosen and there are 2 184 rows in the table, we get about one
The complexity of the precomputation is about 2 × 2 184 2-round encryptions, equivalent to 2 182.1 15-round encryptions. The table requires about 2 184 × 16 = 2 188 bytes of memory.
Data Collection. For 2 122.5 known plaintexts, ask for the encryptions and insert the ciphertexts into a hash table indexed by the 7-th and 8-th bytes of P −1 (∆R 15 ). Since by Property 1, the right half of ciphertexts must have the form
By birthday attack, we can get 2 244 ×2 −16 = 2 228 pairs that the 7-th and 8-th bytes of P −1 (∆R 15 ) are 0.
(b) The complexity of the each operation in this step is about one round encryption, so the complexity of is about: 2 × 
Conclusion
In this paper, we present several 6-round impossible differential paths with F L/F L −1 layers in the middle, which lead to impossible differential attacks on 10-round Camellia-192 and 11-round Camellia-256. Then an impossible differential cryptanalysis of 15-round Camellia-256 without F L/F L −1 layers and whitening is given by carefully using the subkey relation and a precomputational table. A summary of the previous attacks and our analysis of Camellia is given in Table 1 . 
